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Abstract
There is a controversial debate about the e®ects of permanent disability bene¯ts on labor
market behavior. In this paper we estimate equations for deserving and receiving disability
bene¯ts to evaluate the award error as the di®erence in the probability of receiving and
deserving using survey data from Spain. Our results indicate that individuals aged between
55 and 59, self-employers or working in an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving
a bene¯t without deserving it signi¯cantly higher than the rest of individuals. We also
¯nd evidence of gender discrimination since male have a signi¯cantly higher probability of
receiving a bene¯t without deserving it. This seems to con¯rm that disability bene¯ts are
being used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for some individuals approaching
the early retirement or those who do not have right to retire early. Taking into account that
awarding process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some
departments are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability bene¯ts.
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11 Introduction
There is a controversial debate about the e®ects of permanent disability bene¯ts on labor market
behavior. Parsons and Slade (1980) attribute most of the decrease in the participation of the
workforce to the increasing generosity of disability bene¯ts. Leonard (1979) also ¯nds that
repercussions over labor market are considerable, whereas Haveman and Wolfe (1984a, b), Bound
(1989) and Haveman et al., (1991) support that the impact is much more limited. Other factors
like spouse contributions to family income, the disappearance of the stigma associated with
early retirement and more generous early retirement bene¯ts may explain the decline in labor
participation of older workers.
In this paper we study permanent disability bene¯ts award policy concession in Spain in
order to evaluate award errors and policies using data from the Disabilities, De¯ciencies and
Health Status Survey (DDHSS). In a context of an ageing population and increasing shortage
of labor supply this can be specially rellevant in many developed countries, including Spain. In
order to reverse these trends and get more work out of the near elderly (50+) individuals, it is
important to understand the factors (either socioeconomic or health related) and policies behind
bene¯t concession policies and award errors.
Disability bene¯ts in many European countries are due to "truly" medical reasons, to eco-
nomic reasons and/or the combination of these two factors. One of the objectives of this exercise
is to tentatively distinguish between them. For example, those in sample receiving a disability
bene¯ts which do not have any disability can be classi¯ed as receiving a bene¯t dut to "eco-
nomic reasons". Alternatively those receiving a bene¯t having some disabilities but of limited
importance can be classi¯ed as receiving a bene¯t due to the combination of disabilities and
economic reasons or policies. We put special emphasis in the detection of two major redistribu-
tive policies: ¯rstly, a policy easing transitions to inactivity of older individuals; and, secondly,
a policy favoring transitions to inactivity of workers in the less favored regions and thus trans-
ferring income from rich to poor regions. These policies are specially important in the Spanish
case since disability bene¯ts are, ceteris paribus, more generous and better treated ¯scally than
other bene¯ts. Regarding the ¯rst policy mentioned, it is well known that permanent disability
bene¯ts have been intensively used in Europe to ease transitions to retirement before the early
retirement age (see the collection of papers in Gruber and Wise (1999) for illustrations for eleven
countries) and Spain is not an exception. We center the analysis on individuals aged 50{64 be-
cause of for them the e®ect of this policy is much more evident. To illustrate the second policy
we present in Table C.1 (appendix C) the recent trends of the ratio of disability to retirement
bene¯ts by region. It is evident the great disparity of this ratio across Spanish regions. Thus,
it becomes clear the need to audit Social Security awarding process of permanent disability
bene¯ts to determine what kind of social, political or administrative factors are responsible for
the divergences observed.
While there are empirical studies in some countries providing evidence about disability bene-
¯ts (for the US see, for instance, Bound, 1991; Kreider, 1991; Ben¶ ³tez-Silva et al., 2004 and 2005;
Bound et al., 1999 using the Health and Retirement Survey), the lack of adequate data explains
the absence of studies of this kind in Spain.1, The recent disposal of the Disabilities, De¯ciencies
and Health Status Survey (DDHSS from now on) carried out by the Spanish National Bureau
of Statistics in 1999, whose results have recently been published, make it possible to conduct
such an study in Spain.
According to the Social Security Law (Art. 136) an individual deserves a bene¯t if \after
having received the prescribed treatment, presents anatomical or functional serious reductions,
capable of objective and predictably de¯nitive determination, that diminish or eliminates his la-
1For other European countries work is also limited. For details and evidence about disability in some European
countries, including Spain, see the collection of papers in Gruber and Wise (1999)
2bor capacity". Thus, it turns out that the fundamental issue is to have a precise and trustworthy
measure of what is understood by deserving a disability bene¯t. The idea that lies behind the
concept of disability is not exempt from a high degree of subjectivity. Many studies have used
self-reported health and disability measures (Boskin and Hurd, 1978; Gordon and Blinder, 1980;
Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Berkovec and Stern, 1991). Others have argued that these indicators
are not appropriate for measuring working limitations (Zabalza et al., 1980; Chirikos and Nes-
tel, 1984; Bazzoli, 1985; Bound, 1991; Bound et al., 1995; Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). The
most common view is that some survey respondents may in°ate the incidence and severity of
health problems in order to increase the probability of receiving a disability bene¯t (Burkhauser,
1979; Parsons, 1980 ; Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985; Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995). On the
other hand, Stern (1989), Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) and Ben¶ ³tez-Silva et al., (2004 and 2005)
conclude that self-reported measures are reasonable indicators of health status.
One of the main contributions of this paper is the design of a disability indicator that mea-
sures if an individual deserves a permanent disability bene¯t. In the Disabilities Questionnaire
from the DDHSS, respondents are required to enumerate all disabilities su®ered according to a
established classi¯cation of 36 disabilities. Fixing a threshold of severity and expected evolution
of the disability, it is possible to determine whether an individual deserves a disability bene¯t.
For this purpose, we have adopted the de¯nition of what the Social Security understands for
permanent disability, and used it as an standard according to which individuals determine their
level of disability. Although we agree that some individuals have incentives to misreport their
disability status and to exaggerate health problems when applying for a bene¯t, these incentives
disappear when answering a survey in which con¯dentiality is guaranteed. Indeed, in the survey
that we are going to use, 48.75% of men and 33.92% of women who receive a disability bene¯t de-
clare not to su®er any disability. We have proposed six disability indicators and have performed
exogeneity, consistency and unbiased individuals' disability evaluation tests to guarantee that
the surviving indicator represents best the criteria applied by Social Security Administration.
Our results are related with those of Ben¶ ³tez-Silva et al. (2004, 2005), who compare objective,
o±cial data on disability with self-reports. In this paper, under the assumption that the o±cial
data are correct, the hypothesis that self-assessed health is an unbiased indicator of the disability
insurance award decisions cannot be rejected. On the other hand, Baker et al. (2004) have come
to a rather di®erent result, where self-reported measures, i.e., survey reports on chronic ailments
are measured with considerable error compared to medical reports.
To measure the award error we compare two variables: the Social Security awarding decision,
and the deserving indicator designed according to the legal text. The latter variable can be
interpreted as the Social Security decision with perfect information and without any policy
consideration.2 Using information for a set of individuals about whether they receive a disability
bene¯t, and introducing the disability criteria to determine if they deserve or not, we can
estimate the joint distribution of the variables receiving and deserving, from which an award
error can be derived. It is convenient to note that the award error is not the same than the error
type II. The ¯rst refers to the probability of not deserving a bene¯t conditioned to receiving it,
and the second refers to the probability of receiving a bene¯t conditioned to not being disabled.
Our results indicate that individuals aged between 55 and 59, self-employed or working in
an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving a bene¯t without deserving it signi¯cantly
higher than the rest of individuals. This seems to con¯rm that disability bene¯ts are being
used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for those who do not wish to wait until the
early retirement and face the age penalties, or those who do not have right to early retirement
2We face a situation of asymmetric information with a completely informed principal (the individual) and an
agent with incomplete information (the Social Security). The existence of hard-to-diagnose conditions may make
it much more di±cult for Social Security to tag those unable for work from those that are able bodied because of
the imperfect information about the nature of the disability, generating a moral hazard problem.
3because are a±liated to special regimes (see Boldrin et al, 1999 for a description of Social security
rules and regimes). We also ¯nd signi¯cant regional di®erences in the probability of receiving
(again, see Boldrin et al., 1999, for preliminar evidence). Taking into account that awarding
process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some departments
are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability bene¯ts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we explain brie°y the characteristics
of the Spanish disability system, we review literature of disability measures and design our
deserving disability bene¯t indicator. The economic and econometric setup for the analysis is
presented in section 3. Also in this section we describe the data and perform several speci¯cation
diagnostics. In section 4 we present the main estimation results. In section 5 we propose an
alternative mechanism for awarding disability bene¯ts. Finally, in section 6 we conclude with
some policy implications.
2 Disability in Spain: concept, bene¯ts, and measurement.
2.1 Concept of disability
Permanent disability is the situation of a worker that, after going through the prescribed treat-
ment and being released from medical care, still presents serious anatomical or functional re-
ductions, susceptible to objective determination and predictably permanent, that diminish or
impede their ability to work. The possibility of eventually recovering the ability to work will
not be an obstacle to this classi¯cation if such a possibility is estimated as uncertain or very
long term by a medical team.
A worker's anatomical or functional reductions that exist prior to his or her a±liation with
the Social Security will not impede the classi¯cation of his or her situation as permanent disabil-
ity, in the case of disabled people whose conditions have worsened after their a±liation, causing
by themselves or due to the occurrence of new lesions or pathologies a decrease or annulment
of the working capacity they had at the time of their a±liation. Medical records will not be
necessary to assess permanent disability if there are permanent after-e®ects.
The disability situation may be reviewed due to worsening, improvement, or misdiagnosis
of the condition, or due to carrying out work while the disabled person is still under 65 years
of age. It can lead to the con¯rmation or modi¯cation of the degree of the disability, or the
termination of the disability consideration, and therefore, of the disability bene¯ts.
Disability bene¯ts
The Spanish Social Security system provides insurance against both temporary and permanent
illness or disability.
Temporary illness or disability The terms of provision of the subsidy for temporary ill-
ness or disability (incapacidad laboral transitoria) has undergone frequent changes. Eligibility
requires a±liation to the system for a minimum period that depends upon the nature of the
covered risk. Common illness requires only 180 days of contributions during the last 5 years,
whereas no minimum eligibility criterion is imposed for work-related accidents or illnesses.
The bene¯t base depends on actual earnings during the last 12 months. In case of common
illness or work-unrelated accident, the subsidy is equal to 60 percent of the bene¯t base for each
day of absence between the 4-th and the 20-th, and to 75 percent thereafter until the maximum
period (18 months) is reached. After this period the worker must either return to work or,
conditional on passing a medical examination, be classi¯ed as \permanently disabled".
4Contributive disability pensions Contributory disability bene¯ts (DI) are far more gener-
ous than any other old-age program, since they are not subject to penalties for young age or
insu±cient years of contribution. DI bene¯ts are subject to approval by a medical examiner
(notoriously, the tightness of the admissibility criteria used by examiners varies both over time
and across regions) and, since the early 1990s, they have become harder to obtain at older ages
[see Boldrin et al (1999) for further details].3
Disability pensions are distinguished into contributory and non-contributory. They are con-
verted into retirement pensions once the bene¯ciaries turn 65 years of age, but keeping a very
favorable tax treatment. Eligibility and pension amounts depend on the level of disability. The
1985 reform distinguished four levels of permanent disability characterized by increasing severity.
Since then, the legislation has formally reduced them to three, but it has also created a special
subcase of the ¯rst level with the explicit purpose of using the disability funds to subsidize the
dismissal of old workers from certain sectors or geographical areas. The ¯rst level (incapacidad
permanente total para la profesi¶ on habitual, or IPT) corresponds to inability to do the usual
job. A special subcase (incapacidad permanente total cuali¯cada para la profesi¶ on habitual, or
IPTC) applies only to employees older than 55 which are in particular socioeconomic situations.
The second level (incapacidad permanente absoluta, or IPA) corresponds to inability to do any
kind of job. The third level (gran invalidez, or GI) requires, in addition, continued attendance
by other persons in order to carry out the basic vital functions. In terms of requirements, when
disability is caused by an ordinary illness, eligibility to a pension requires from 5 to 15 years
of contributions, depending on age. There is no contributive requirement when the disability is
caused by an accident, whether or not work-related, or a professional illness.
The bene¯t base depends on the source of disability. In case of ordinary illness, it is computed
as for old-age pensions. For work-unrelated accident, it is the average annual wage over a period
of 24 consecutive months chosen by the person within the last 7 years of work. For work-related
accident or professional illness, it is the average wage in the last year of work. The pension
equals 55 percent of the bene¯t base under IPT, and increases to 75 percent under IPTC. In
case of IPA, it is equal to 100 of the bene¯t base, whereas for GI it is equal to 100 percent of
the bene¯t base plus another 50 percent covering the person taking care of the disabled.
2.2 Disability measures
Labor capacity is an important determinant of labor behavior and a®ects the retirement decision
and the application for disability bene¯ts. Most people argue that one of the crucial reasons for
retiring before the normal age is poor health status. However, several reasons can lead us to
suppose that self-reported measures are biased. Anderson and Burkhauser (1984) pointed that
searching for good disability measures is one of the open questions in the study of older workers
labor behavior. The true disability status is an unobservable variable, but di®erent measures
can be used to approximate it. In general, disability measures can be classi¯ed into two groups:
Objective measures: they are not based on self-reported health status and do not present,
as a rule, endogeneity problems. Mortality rates, number of days of work lost because of illness
or body mass index are some examples.
Subjective measures: we can distinguish between global and speci¯c subjective measures.
3It is the responsibility of the Provincial Directorates of the INSS through the Disability Evaluation Teams
and in every stage of the procedure, to declare the Permanent Disability condition so bene¯ts may be assigned.
The Provincial Directorate of the INSS will issue a resolution in a maximum of 135 days. If no resolution has been
issued within this deadline, the application shall be deemed denied by way of negative administrative silence. If
it is necessary to ask for a hearing or if complementary documentation is requested, the interested party will have
10 days to argue his case or present the documentation.
51. Global measures are based on self-reported health status. They are normally recorded
according to question like, how would you de¯ne your health status: excellent, good,
regular or bad? Do you think that the quantity or quality of work you do is a®ected by
some problem of health or disability?
Anderson and Burkhauser (1984), Bound (1991) and Waidman et al. (1995) indicated that
these measures have several problems. First of all, they are based on personal judgements
of health status and it is very di±cult to compare answers from di®erent individuals.
Second, self-reported measures may not be independent of what we are trying to explain.
The main reason is that some survey respondents may in°ate the severity of their health
problems in order to rationalize their relation with economic activity (p.e. unemployment).
However Ben¶ ³tez Silva et al. (2004, 2005) de¯ne a variable called \true disability" if the
individual considers that he su®ers any impairment or health problem that limits the
amount of work he can do. They use this measure for identifying type I and type II
errors in permanent disability bene¯ts. Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Bound and
Waidmann (1992) criticize this de¯nition because individuals who apply for a bene¯t, and
those who are receiving it may have incentives to exaggerate health problems. Finally,
sometimes individuals unable to continue working may apply for early retirement. Then,
those with a high relative value of leisure are going to have ¯nancial incentives to identify
themselves as disabled.
2. Speci¯c measures, which are self-reported measures based on speci¯c conditions of the
individual. Cardiovascular illnesses or vertebral column de¯ciencies are good examples of
this type of variables, which are less prone to su®er systematic errors than global sub-
jective measures. This kind of measures can be used as indicators of health status in a
participation equation (Bound et al., 1995). However, this strategy is not very common
and speci¯c measures are usually employed as instruments for global subjective measures
(Stern, 1989; Bound et al., 1998). The limitation of the method proposed by Stern (1989)
is that the in°uence of another economic variables over retirement decisions is left unidenti-
¯ed. The implicit assumption when using this technique is that self-reported health status
is insensitive to psychological and monetary incentives.
The choice of the disability measure is very important because it may bias the results ob-
tained (Anderson and Burkhauser, 1984). Endogeneity problems are going to overestimate the
impact of health status over labor force participation, while measurement errors are going to
underestimate this e®ect. However, these biases operate in opposite directions and controls can
be implemented to obtain upper and lower thresholds for the e®ect of reported disability over
labor behavior (Bound, 1991).
At the end, one has to consider the trade o® between measurement error of objective mea-
sures, and measurement error and endogeneity problems of subjective measures. Both the
objective and the subjective indicators are correlated with education, occupation and earnings.
These variables are also important for explaining exit from the labor force. One interpretation
for these correlations is that individuals with poor health status tend to retire earlier and that
bad employment perspectives make workers leave the labor force, and afterwards they justify
their exit as a decrease in labor capacity.
2.3 Design of the disability indicator
In this section we present several alternatives in order to determine whether an individual
deserves a permanent disability bene¯t using the DDHSS survey de¯nes a disability as any
serious limitation that a®ects for more than one year the activity of the individual and that
6has its origin in a de¯ciency. Therefore, a respondent is considered to be not disabled if he
does not have any di±culty in achieving any of 36 daily living activities (see the appendix for
details). So the above de¯nition is based on the individual's subjective perception of her own
limitations.4 The concept of disability relies on the idea of de¯ciency as the only possible origin
of the disability, that is to say, it tries to analyze if the individual is capable of performing a
determined activity independently if he really practices it or not. It is also necessary to bear
in mind that disabilities cannot be given alone, but the same person can be a®ected by two or
more disabilities that can be independent among them, originated by di®erent de¯ciencies or by
the same one.
The Spanish legislation applies the professional disability principle to determine who deserves
a bene¯t. This principle takes into account three factors: the set of sequels, ailments and
diseases, the occupations a®ected by limitations, and the particular e®ect on each individual
(Barba Mora, 2001). It is not possible to consider the second factor because we do not know
the occupation for pensioners without disabilities. As regards to the third factor it is impossible
to consider in a model variables such as resistance to pain and personality, which are genuinely
unobservable. In order to relieve this disadvantage we are going to restrict the analysis to survey
respondents from 45 to 59 years old. This means that we only require elements of pathological
character. The determination of the degree needed to establish permanent disability would
require very deep medical knowledge. Since we do not rely on this information, we will only
look at the external symptoms of the de¯ciencies, i.e., we focus on disabilities. For each disability
we are going to ¯x a threshold of severity, prognosis and origin and will assume that an individual
deserves a disability bene¯t when passing the threshold.
In order to be as exhaustive as possible we design six di®erent criteria for deserving a disabil-
ity bene¯t. The de¯nition of the various criteria used is described in Table 1. We distinguish
aspects of the variable severity, evolution, or origin of the each de¯ciency. Each criterion is
represented by a binary indicator that takes the value one it the individual satis¯es the criterion
and value zero otherwise. Afterwards we choose the best criterion for estimation of the model
using exogeneity and consistency tests for each of the variables. We assume that individuals
who have not answered the Disabilities and De¯ciencies Questionnaires do not su®er any kind
of health problem, so all criteria take the value zero for them.
3 Economic and econometric Framework
After receiving an invalidity shock the individual goes to temporary illness/invalidity bene¯ts.
The invalidity shock cause a decrease in the individual earnings potential. In particular, we
consider that the wage process w is shifted downwards by the health shock (wt = w¤ht, h · 1)5.
The individual may recover (partially) or not but the degree of recovery is not observable to
the Social Security. After exhaustion of temporary bene¯ts, the individuals decides whether to
apply or not. However, since the application process is unobservable for, we assume that all the
individuals that in sample apply for a disability pension.6 If he applies for disability bene¯ts,
he may be rewarded or not, and in case of acceptance, he will receive them until death (T). But
if the application is rejected he has to return to work at a lower expected wage until retirement
age (¿).
Then the expected income of returning to work (EYW) is equal to the utility of labor earnings
(w) until retirement age plus retirement bene¯ts (RB) from that moment till death, where ¨
4All disabilities are investigated even if they are overcome with the use of some technical help. See the appendix
A for details.
5Spanish legislation establishes that in case of a reduction in e±ciency at working place, wage may be dimin-
ished up to a 25%.
6The Application process has several advantages and practically no cost.
7Table 1: Six alternative criterion for deserving a disability bene¯t
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4
Severity Can present one of the
following degrees:
·  Serious difficulty
·  Cannot do the
activity








Forecast Can present one of the
following degrees:
·  Stable, without
perspectives of
improvement
·  Can go worse
·  It’s not possible to
determine
Can present one of the
following degrees:
·  Recoverable with
restrictions
·  Stable, without
perspectives of
improvement
·  Can go worse








Origin All except congenital and
problems in the childbirth
All except congenital and
problems in the childbirth
All All
Objective We consider disabilies with a high degree of severity and unfavorable forecast
Criterion 5 Criterion 6
Severity Can present one of the following degrees:
·  Moderate difficulty
·  Serious difficulty
·  Cannot do the activity
Same requirement of severity than criterion 5.
Forecast Same requirement of forecast than criterion 1
and when severity is moderate we consider
that forecast may be:
·  Can go wose
·  It’s not possible to determine
Same requirement of forecast than criterion 2, and
when severity is moderate we consider that
forecast may be:
·  Can go worse
·  It’s not possible to determine.
Origin All except congenital and problems in the
childbirth
All
Objective We include degenerative diseases  (Parkinson, Alzheimer)
denotes the time passed from one moment to another.
EYW(t) = wt¨(t;¿) + RB¨(¿;T)
We follow Lumsdaine et al. (1997) to specify the utility function. Let U denote the utility
function and suppose that it includes a systematic predetermined part and a stochastic random
one.





where ¼(sjt) denotes the probability of surviving to period s given survival to period t; ¯ is the
discount factor and u is a random component.
The expected income (EYA) in case of applying for disability bene¯ts at time t is given by:
EYA(t) = [atDBt + (1 ¡ at)wt]
where at is the probability getting the disability bene¯ts ((DB)), and w denotes the wage if the




¼(sjt)¯s¡t [¹°EYA(t)° + vt]
8where ¹ represents the relative value of income in the post-application state to income in the
pre-application state (income may produce more or less utility after application for disability
bene¯ts) and v is a random component.
An individual applies for disability bene¯ts if EUA > EUw;that is, if:
T X
s=t




where, !t = vt ¡ ut. Finally, the probability of applying for disability bene¯ts at time t :
Pr[Apply at t] = Pr[
T X
s=t





Our econometric framework is based on a two-equations latent variable model. 7 We de¯ne two
latent unobservable variables corresponding to Social Security's decision of awarding a perma-
nent disability bene¯t, r¤; and to the true disability status, d¤: Those individuals who receive a
disability bene¯t but don't deserve it, consider at the time of the application that they prefer
to receive a permanent disability bene¯t from now on instead of returning to work and waiting
until retirement age.
r¤ = X0¯r + "r
where X is a vector of characteristics observed by the Social Security administration, and
¯r is the corresponding vector of parameters. The term "r can be interpreted as some kind of
information known by the applicant, but unknown by the Social Security. This term can be
understood as a \bureaucratic" noise that interferes the assignment process. So X0¯r +"r is the
score the applicant gets according to Social Security rules using a continuous scale. Applicants
with a high score will receive a disability bene¯t. Instead of r¤ we observe a binary indicator
r = 1(r¤ > 0).
To represent if the applicant deserves a permanent disability measure we use a similar equa-
tion:
d¤ = Z0¯d + "d
where Z is a set of variables that measure health status and ¯d is the corresponding vector
of coe±cients or \weights". The term "d gathers some information that is only known by the
applicant. As before, instead of d¤ we observe the binary indicator d = 1(d¤ > 0).
We suppose that ("r;"d) are distributed as a bivariate normal with zero mean vector, vari-
ances normalized to one an correlation coe±cient ½ 2 (¡1;1):
We could, a priori, think that the set of variables X and Z have to be the same. This is true
for variables related to disabilities and de¯ciencies, but there are some variables that can a®ect
the probability of receiving although not the probability of deserving. We specially refer to the
place of residence because it does not a®ect heath status but given that the assignment process
depends on Social Security Provincial Departments, some di®erences in the level of exigency of
disability requirements can emerge.
7See Ben¶ ³tez-Silva et. al, (2005) for an extended version of the model.
9As there are only four combinations for the variables r and d, the likelihood function can be
written in terms of a multinomial distribution:
p11 = L(r = 1;d = 1j¯r;¯d;½;X;Z)
p10 = L(r = 1;d = 0j¯r;¯d;½;X;Z)
p01 = L(r = 0;d = 1j¯r;¯d;½;X;Z)




































where ©2 denotes the bivariate normal distribution function.
3.2 Description of the data
As stated, our main data source is the Disabilities, De¯ciencies and Health Status Survey
(DDHSS) carried out by the Spanish National Bureau of Statistics in 1999. A sample of 70,402
households and 218,185 people were interviewed, from which 10,484 were less than 6 years old
and 207,701 were 6 or more years. [see the Appendix A for further details on survey characteris-
tics and Appendix B for a description of disabilities and the variables employed in the empirical
analysis.] We apply several ¯lters to the original ¯le in order to get the relevant samples (see
Table 2 for a summary) for the purposes of our study:
1. Initial sample (sample A): We select individuals in the 45{59 age range, for which disability
is likely to constitute a pathway to a permanent exit from the labor force. However, we
keep observations for younger individuals to draw comparisons with older individuals and
make more evident the various policies in place.
A The surviving sample has 19442 males and 20489 females.
2. Restricted initial sample (sample B): we apply the following restrictions to sample A:
(a) We eliminate individuals without a contributive career.
(b) We eliminate the individuals that are working but whose professional situation is
unknown.
B This leaves a sample of 18235 males and 8142 females. In these samples there are indi-
viduals with and without disabilities and we are going to use them for exogeneity and
consistency tests.8
8Those individuals who do not su®er any disability do not answer to the Disabilities and De¯ciencies Ques-
tionnaire. We do not know if they have an impairment certi¯cate, need a caretaker, have ¯nished a rehabilitation
treatment or have changed of house because of a disability. But we suppose that the answer to all these questions
is negative because otherwise they would have ¯lled in the questionnaire.
10Table 2: Description of the samples
Sample Characteristics Gender:Size Purposes
A Individuals aged 45{59 Men: 19442 Screening mechanism
Women: 20489
B + some requirements on Men: 18235 Exogeneity and consistency test
economic activity Women: 8142 Bivariate probit
B1 Ind. with disabilities Men: 984 Rational expectations test
+ requirements on LFS Women: 552 Bivariate probit
B0 Ind. w/ disabilities Men: 16980 Prob of receiving
+ requirements on LFS Women: 7461 being healthy
3. Sample with disabilities (sample B1). This sample is constructed by applying the following
criteria to sample B:
(a) We drop all individuals that do not answer the Disabilities Questionnaire.
(b) From the sample of individuals who receive a permanent disability bene¯t and answer
the Disabilities Questionnaire we eliminate 145 observations for which we do not know
the occupation and 255 observations for which we do not know the labor force status
before receiving the bene¯t.
In this sample, we de¯ne a binary variable that takes the value one if the individual
is receiving a contributive permanent disability bene¯t. However this situation is not
incompatible with an active labor force status. For example, 6.43% of men and 2.02% of
women are also working and 2.66% of men and 0.81% of women are looking for a job.
B1 That leaves a sample of 984 men and 552 women. We perform the rational expectations
test with this ¯nal sample.
4. Sample without disabilities (sample B0).
B0 Those observations in sample B that are not assigned to sample B1, excluding the ones
that have been eliminated, are assigned to sample B0. The resulting sample consist of
16980 males and 7491 females.
3.3 A ¯rst look at the data
First of all, from the sample of 984 men and 552 women, 20.05% of men and 13.99% of women
who receive a bene¯t do not deserve it using our preferred criterion #6. So, the award error
is much larger for men than for women9. There are several disabilities that are not present
among individuals who receive but do not deserve the bene¯t (disability for global visual tasks,
for hearing any sound, for communicating through alternative languages, not sealed gestures or
reading-writing, for remembering people/objects or informations/past episodes and for executing
simple or complex orders are examples). Among women in the award error area there is nobody
with disabilities for hearing strong sounds, listening the speech, maintaining body postures,
washing oneself, controlling physical needs, eating and drinking, dressing and undressing. On the
other hand, individuals who receive but do not deserve usually declare to su®er osteoarticular or
9See Appendix C, tables C.2 and C.3 for descriptive statistics.
11musculoskeletal de¯ciencies in column and upper and low extremities, and disabilities for moving
not heavy objects and using utensils and tools. Undoubtedly, these de¯ciencies are painful, but
is di±cult to check how severe they are (P¶ erez Rueda et al., 2000). Moreover, none of these
individuals needs a caretaker for daily activities. As regards those individuals who receive and
deserve, the most common disabilities are for getting up and down, moving not heavy objects,
moving without way of transport, going in public transport or driving own vehicle.
A look at socioeconomic characteristics (Table C.4) reveals that there are more married
men pensioners than women, and 90% of men who do not deserve are household breadwinners.
Approximately half of pensioners that deserve are between 55 and 59 years old and around 30%
of those who do not deserve belong to this age interval. A majority of male pensioners only have
elementary education that previously were skilled workers. Also a majority of female pensioners
only have elementary education but were mainly unskilled workers.
In Table C.5 we report the spouse's labor force status for married/cohabiting individuals
in sample. If he/she is married but is not a pensioner, the probability of observing the spouse
working is higher than if he/she is a pensioner and deserves, and twice larger than if he/she is
pensioner and does not deserve. In all cases, the probability of husband working is twice the
probability of wife working. It is very interesting to realize that if he/she is a pensioner and does
not deserve the probability that the spouse receives a permanent disability bene¯t is ¯ve times
than if he/she is not a pensioner. This result is more evident for the case of husbands (37.5%
with respect to 9.06%). Finally, when the husband is a pensioner there is a higher percentage
of houseworker wives. Alternatively, when the wife is the pensioner the husband is more likely
to be in any other situation.
4 Diagnostics on the disability indicators
With the intention of determining which one of the six disability indicators previously de¯ned
best represents the legal benchmark of permanent disability given by the Social Security we
perform three diagnosis tests. The surviving indicator will be used in the estimation of the
permanent disability bene¯t award rate.
4.1 Exogeneity test
As already mentioned before, the exogeneity of self-reported disability status is quite controver-
sial. Before estimating the model and using the results with policy purposes, we would like to
be sure that the deserving indicator is strictly exogenous. Possible endogeneity of the regressor
coupled with measurement errors would lead to inconsistent estimations (Ben¶ ³tez-Silva et al.,
2004, 2005). We use Heckman's (1978) proposal using a two equation system to make such a
test. The ¯rst structural equation represents the Social Security award decision and the second
one indicates whether the individual deserves a disability bene¯t:
r¤
i = X1i¯1 + di®1 + u1i
d¤
i = X2i¯2 + u2i
where r¤ and d¤ are two latent continuous variables, Xj;j = 1;2 are vectors of exogenous vari-
ables referred to disabilities and de¯ciencies, and (u1;u2) are jointly normal with zero mean
vector, variances normalized to one and correlation coe±cient ½ 2 (¡1;1). To achieve identi¯ca-
tion we follow a two step procedure: we, ¯rst, regress the deserving and receiving indicator over
the set of disabilities and de¯ciencies; in a second step we drop the variables with non-signi¯cant
coe±cients. After imposing these exclusion restrictions, we estimate a bivariate probit using the
12Table 3: Exogeneity test on the restricted initial sample (sample B).
Men [N=18.235] Women [N= 8.142]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Criterion 1 6.6919 0.0071 2.5732 0.2698
Criterion 2 5.2417 0.0299 1.6519 0.4846
Criterion 3 2.4496 0.2936 1.2539 0.6020
Criterion 4 1.1703 0.6282 0.6004 0.8136
Criterion 5 0.9991 0.6829 0.0085 0.9976
Criterion 6 0.0172 0.9951 0.0032 0.9990
restricted initial sample (sample B). In this context the exogeneity of the deserving equation
can be checked by means of the test ½ = 0.
Another possibility to test exogeneity of the deserving indicator is the Lagrange multiplier
test. Under the null of exogeneity, the model is composed by two independent probit equations
and bivariate probabilities and densities coincide with the product of the corresponding marginal
ones. To construct the test we follow Kiefer (1982) and Greene (1993).10 First, we de¯ne
±1i = °1i¯0
1X1i and ±2i = °2i¯0
2X2i where °i1 = 2ri ¡ 1 and °i2 = 2di ¡ 1, r and d are the binary
indicators of the events 1(r¤ > 0) and 1(d¤ > 0), respectively. Given this notation the joint
log-likelihood can be written as




where ½¤ = °i1°i2½. The LM or score test is a quadratic form which uses the ¯rst derivatives
of the unrestricted likelihood function whose weighting matrix is the inverse of the information
matrix for the unrestricted likelihood function when both equations are evaluated under the

























Table 3 reports the exogeneity test by gender for the set of criteria de¯ned. We cannot reject
the null of exogeneity for indicators 3 to 6 in the case of men and for any criterion in the case
of women, at standard signi¯cance levels. This implies that, for the case of men, the indicators
that consider disabilities with highest levels of severity and excludes congenital and childbirth
problems as possible origin of the de¯ciency, are rejected. Consequently, a preferred disability
criteria should be capable of gathering degenerative pathologies whatever origin they could have.
10See Rivers and Vuong (1988) for an exogeneity test in probit models. Recently, Fabbri et al (2005) discussed
the statistical properties of LM test and other alternatives in simultaneous discrete choice models.
13Table 4: Consistency test. Restricted initial sample (sample B).
Men (N=18235)
Criterion 3 Criterion 4 Criterion 5 Criterion 6
Stat p-val Stat p-val Stat p-val Stat p-val
OLS F(63;18171) 1.76 0.0002 1.76 0.0002 1.36 0.0313 1.01 0.4525
Probit Â2
63 86.81 0.0251 89.20 0.0166 96.66 0.0041 73.40 0.1740
M Logit Â2
63 93.20 0.0080 95.55 0.0051 104.47 0.0008 81.44 0.0590
Women (N=8142)
OLS F(63;8078) 1.47 0.0097 1.57 0.0028 1.27 0.0736 1.15 0.1920
Probit Â2
63 93.55 0.0075 92.06 0.0099 51.22 0.8560 52.97 0.8122
M Logit Â2
63 99.72 0.0022 98.55 0.0028 52.97 0.8122 63.12 0.4720
4.2 Consistency test
The second diagnosis refers to consistency. We want to verify if what individuals believe to be
disabled is, coincides, in expected terms, with Social Security actual de¯nition of permanent
disability. Therefore, we test whether the deserving indicator based on self-reported disability
status is an unbiased estimator of the permanent disability award indicator. We test that:
E[r ¡ djX] = 0
where X is the same vector of 36 disabilities and 27 de¯ciencies used for the exogeneity test.
Unbiasedness can be tested through di®erent ways. First, we can regress, by LS, (r¡d) on a set
of explanatory variables and test the hypothesis that all coe±cients are equal to zero. Second,
using a multinomial logit model we can regress (r¡d) over the same set of explanatory variables
and test the same hypothesis using a likelihood ratio test against a restricted model which only
includes a constant. Finally, we can perform a likelihood ratio test using the results of a probit
model of jr ¡ dj on a set of variables against a restricted probit model which only includes a
constant term. In all three cases we use the restricted initial sample or sample B.
The results of the test are reported in Table 4. We have only carried consistency test for
criteria 3 to 6 because of criteria 1 and 2 did not satisfy exogeneity and we are looking for a valid
disability indicator for both men and women. For men, only criterion 6 satis¯es all consistency
tests, and for women both criteria 5 and 6 are valid under the results of these diagnostics.
Therefore, in what follows we use criterion 6 both for men and women. This implies that the
only surviving disability indicator is the one that considers all possible origins of the de¯ciency
and includes moderate disability associated with an unfavorable prognosis.
This criteria includes congenital and childbirth problems because accepting that the pathol-
ogy has to be a sudden coming as general principle, it is necessary to distinguish to disease
from the disability, since the decisive element is not that the ¯rst one was present in a±liation
date but the moment in which the disability appears. It also contains moderate severe disability
that can go worse in the future. The justi¯cation is that what de¯nes permanent disability
is not the lack of health but the binomial disease - profession or the relation between sequels
and reduction of the abilities for the work. Nevertheless, the exigency of permanency has to
be reeled to reasonable terms, since, the law admits the future possibility of recovery, through
the ¯gure of the improvement review, institution that eliminates the risk of a life declaration
without possibility of repeal.
14Table 5: Rational expectations test. Restricted initial sample (sample B1).





4.3 Unbiased individuals' disability evaluation test
The results of the previous sections suggest that the deserving indicator based of self-reported
disability status is an exogenous determinant and consistent estimator of the Social Security
award decision. However, the tests presented above are based on asymptotic properties of the
relevant test statistics, but in small samples they might have little power. Our key hypothesis
is that applicants have a through understanding of the award process, including full knowledge
of the weights ¯r that Social Security places on various characteristics X; so the null hypothesis
that we want to test is:
¯r = ¯d
If the rational expectations hypothesis holds, then the deserving indicator constitutes a valid
measure of the degree of disability required for receiving a disability bene¯t, and it can be used
to measure the magnitude of the classi¯cation errors in the permanent disability bene¯ts award
process11.
Table 5 provide the results for the sample of men and women that have declared to su®er
some disability (sample B1). We have estimated a bivariate probit model in which we have
included as explanatory variables the same disabilities and de¯ciencies for the Social Security
and for the applicant's equation. For both samples we cannot reject, at standard signi¯cance
levels, the null hypothesis that the parameter vectors are equal.
In Figure 1 we plot the estimated density functions for both the awarding and deserving
decisions by gender. Note that that deserving' density function is slightly more skewed to the
right than the corresponding to Social Security. This means that is more di±cult for the Social
Security to distinguish between individuals with the same observable variables than it is for the
individuals themselves. For women this result is even more evident. This is an implication of
the rational expectations test, because it shows that individuals have internalized the rules that
Social Security uses in the process of awarding bene¯ts.
5 Empirical results
In this section we present the results of the empirical analysis by gender for two di®erent sub-
samples: (a) individuals with disabilities (sample B1); and, (b) individuals without disabilities
(sample B0).
5.1 Individuals with disabilities
We have estimated a common probit model for the decisions of deserving and receiving a per-
manent disability bene¯t (see Table D.1) restricting the sample to individuals with disabilities
(sample B1). We assume that deserving precedes in time to receiving. Having a disability or de¯-
ciency has a positive and signi¯cant impact on both equations. We ¯nd some additional variables
with signi¯cative impact on the probabilities: age between 55 and 59, change of house because
11See Ben¶ ³tez-Siva et al., 2004 and 2005 for further analysis on unbiased reporting.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































r12. The baseline probabilities of deserving are 0.324 for men and 0.211 for women.
12Marginal e®ects for men are reported in Table D.2, and table of marginal e®ects for women are available on
request.
16Figure 2: Di®erence between the Social Security decision and the deserving indicator by gender
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W e could think that these probabilities are too high given that individual only su®ers disabilities
of moderate severity . But we have to take into account that although we have tried to consider
the maximum number of daily living activities when elaborating the self-reported disability
indicators, there are several unobserved factors such as pain or personality that cannot be
controlled for (P¶ erez Rueda et al., 2000). The baseline probabilities of receiving are 0.439 for
men and 0.295 for women. That is, they are 40.31% and 40.29% higher than the corresponding
deserving probabilities. Moreover, men have a probability of deserving and receiving higher than
women (53.68% and 47.61%, respectively), but di®erences between deserving and receiving are
about the same regardless the gender.
[REVISE] W e have performed a linear regression of the di®erence between the Social Security
awarding decision and the deserving indicator for both samples. Afterwards, we have plotted
the predicted probability of the di®erence for each age and the con¯dence interv al at 95% of
signi¯cance (see Figure 2). The most signi¯cant result is that we observe a positive predicted
v alue, that is, bene¯t awarded by Social Security but undeserved according to the disability
indicator, mostly for individuals older than 55. This is a con¯rmation that awarding error is
positively correlated with age, and that undue bene¯ts are mainly awarded to workers near to
early retirement age.
Disabilities, de¯ciencies and health variables Table 6 shows for both genders the dis-
abilities whose marginal e®ects are the highest, both for deserving and receiving. The only
disabilities with similar deserving and receiving probabilities are going in public transport for
men and communicating for women. For men, the probability of deserving is smaller than the
probability of receiving for de¯ciencies in upper an lower extremities (152.61%), houseworking
(96.89%) and communicating (53.21%). As regards women, the same happens for executing
orders (165.81%), moving inside home (61.09%) and maintaining body postures (60.02%). Dis-
abilities for moving inside home, houseworking and maintaining body postures are related to
de¯ciencies in the vertebral column and upper and lower extremities. In most cases they have
an osteoarticular origin (arthritis, rheumatism, curvature of the spine, disc hernia) and this
make diagnosis quite di±cult because the aptitude for bearing pain is neither measurable not
17Table 6: Key marginal e®ect of disabilities in both the probability of deserving and receiving.
Deserve Receive
Men
Relating to people (98.26%)
Looking after oneself (64.11%)
Moving inside home (56.6%)
Going in public transport (48.78%)
Relating to people (47.79%)
Houseworking (46.71%)
Communicating (40.52%)











Age is another important determinant of both probabilities. The probability of deserving
increases 8.28 and 30.64 for men and women, respectively. Interestingly, the probability of
receiving is higher than the probability of deserving (45.02% for men and 24.69% for women).
Without any doubt, these results illustrate that disability pensions have been used to ease
transitions to retirement before the age bene¯ts are ¯rst available (an issue mentioned by Boldrin
et al., 1999).
Needing a caretaker for daily living activities increases the deserving probability in 92.46%
for men and 40.73% for women. This variable is quite trustworthy because an individual who
needs somebody to take care of him deserves and should receive a disability bene¯t. Whether
an individual has changed of house because of a disability, produces an increase in the receiving
probability of 53.03% for men and 66.73% for women. If he/she has an impairment certi¯cate,
raises these probabilities by 59.84% for men and 77.17% for women. It is important to underline
that for the case of men with an impairment certi¯cate, the probability of receiving nearly
doubles the deserving one. This implies that the impairment certi¯cate, which gives some ¯scal
advantages, is being used for purposes other than getting disability bene¯ts.
Finally, for women, having completed a treatment of rehabilitation increases the deserving
and receiving probabilities by 8.16%, and 4.33%, respectively. The impact is signi¯catively
greater for men with corresponding ¯gures of 14.68% and 25.57%.
Socioeconomic variables Being unemployed increases the probability of deserving by 52.49%
for men and 31.88% for women13. This may be because poor health workers have a higher prob-
ability of becoming unemployed and experiment longer periods of unemployment than others
(Stewart, 2001; Ruhm, 2000, 2003), but also because the unemployed face lower opportunity
costs of applying for disability bene¯ts than employed, that is, they would not apply for bene¯ts
while employed but will do it in the event of job loss (Autor and Duggan, 2003). However, the
receiving probability when unemployed decreases by 25.18% for men and 94.78% for women.
Perhaps, there exist certain reticences for awarding disability bene¯ts to unemployed workers to
avoid the phenomenon known as \hidden unemployment" (Parsons, 1980 ; Haveman and Wolfe,
1984a).
An endogeneity problem for the variable unemployed would imply that poor health is the
cause rather than the consequence of losing ones job. To check what is the main reason of
unemployment we have used one of the questions of the DDHS survey: \Have you changed your
13The binary variable \unemployed" takes the value one in two cases: ¯rst, if at the time of the survey the
individual is unemployed; and second, if the individual is receiving a permanent disability bene¯t but his labor
force status before becoming pensioner was unemployed.
18relation with economic activity due to a disability?". From the sample of 984 men (552 women),
there are 85 men (70 women) unemployed, from which only 11 men (9 women) answered in the
a±rmative to the previous question, indicating also that they were working before health shock
and just afterwards became unemployed. We consider that this percentage (12.94% for men,
12.85% for women) is very reduced and we can avoid any endogeneity problem.
Clearly marital status and household breadwinner are additional policy variables for bene¯t
concession. While marital status is not signi¯cant in the deserving equation, being married
increases the receiving probability by 8.65% for men and 1.66% for women. Moreover, if the
individual is the head of the household, the receiving probabilities increase 7.53% for men and
18.86% for women.
Concerning variables related to the economic activity of the spouse14, if the individual is
a pensioner the probability that the spouse is working decreases 10.65% for men and 28.87%
for women. On the other hand, there is a positive correlation for the case of both spouses
being disability pensioners. If one spouse receives a disability bene¯t, the probability that
the other also receives bene¯ts increases by 22.47% for men and 35.46% for women. This
evidences some scale economies in bene¯t claim (when one of the spouses is a pensioner, he/she
knows the awarding mechanism and it is easier for the other spouse to apply for it) and/or
complementarities in leisure.
The probability of deserving increases 93.01% for men (61.23% for women) when moving
from college education and white collar occupation to elementary education and unskilled job.
It also increases 49.55% for men (39.43% for women) when moving to high school level and
skilled job. The deserving probability increases more when moving from college-white collar to
high school-white collar (49.36%) than when moving to college-skilled (12.95%), for men. For
women, we can observe that the opposite is true, although di®erences are smaller(17.10% in the
¯rst case and 21.37% in the second one).
The receiving probability achieves its maximum when the individual has elementary edu-
cation and an unskilled job, and it decreases as the level of education and/or the quality of
occupation increases. In this sense, Autor and Duggan (2003) account for the role of disability
bene¯ts in inducing labor force exit among the low-skilled workers. For both gender, the proba-
bility of receiving increases more with the educational level than with the occupation. Moreover,
it seems to have a relationship with the manual character of the jobs.15 Table 7, which crosstab-
ulates the prevalence of hands and ¯ngers disabilities with skill by gender, strongly supports
this argument, since these disabilities are very concentrated in unskilled (female) workers.
Undoubtedly the region of residence hides additional policy tools for bene¯t concession: the
level of income and the fraction of agricultural workers: individuals in the low-income and high-
fraction of agricultural workers regions of Murcia, Andalucia and Extremadura, have signi¯cantly
higher probabilities of receiving bene¯ts than individuals in other regions (see Table C.1). We
will develop further this argument in the next section.
5.2 Individuals without disabilities
We have conducted a ¯nal test of the awarding process in the subsample which only contains
individuals without disabilities (16980 men and 7461 women, sample B0). Our purpose is to
study the probability of receiving a bene¯t conditional on being healthy (Table D.3), that is
14Several studies, for example Peracchi and Welch (1994), Blau and Riphahn (1999) or Jim¶ enez et al. (1999)
have observed that the spouse's labor force status a®ects retirement behavior of the other member of the couple.
In this paper we have proxied the spouse's labor status using two dummy variables indicating whether he/she is
working or receiving a permanent disability bene¯t.
15For example: assembly lines, seamstresses in court and confection workshops, workmen of toys factories,
replacers of supermarkets. In all these occupations, there are many unskilled workers that become unable for
doing their jobs if they su®er any kind of manual disability.
19Table 7: Manual disabilities and skill level
Men (N=984) Women (N=552)
White collar Skilled Unskilled White collar Skilled Unskilled
Moving not heavy objects 16.32 34.21 49.47 14.81 17.28 67.90
Using tools 11.39 33.66 54.95 13.51 14.86 71.62
Manipulating small objects 14.60 32.12 53.28 15.32 12.61 72.07
the probability of receiving a bene¯ts solely on economic grounds. We specify the conditional
probability model as a Probit. The set of explanatory variables includes controls for education,
place of residence, marital status, main household breadwinner and age group. We are not
able to capture di®erences related to the activity sector or professional situation since they are
not available for non-working pensioners. Once we have estimated the model, we compute the
marginal e®ects with respect to a baseline individual with the following characteristics: single,
no breadwinner, high school education and living in Asturias or Cantabria. The results are
reported in Table D.4.
The probability of receiving a bene¯t being healthy sharply increases with the age group
(the probability of receiving a bene¯t for those aged 55{59 practically doubles that of those aged
45{49), and decreases with education and for those that are main breadwinner for both gender.
Partially in contrast with the results for individuals with disabilities, by region the probability of
receiving a bene¯t conditional on being healthy is much higher in Asturias-Cantabria (specially
for men), Murcia (specially for women) Andalusia and, to a lesser extend, in Extremadura than
in any other region. This con¯rms that policymakers allow some healthy individuals to get
(disability) bene¯ts without any penalties and, more importantly, without any disability, before
the early retirement age, specially in poorer (see Table C.1) Northern regions (such as Asturias-
Cantabria) and Southern regions such as Andalucia and Extremadura. Thus, as in many other
EU countries disability bene¯ts, disability bene¯ts have been used with redistributive purposes,
in order to increase per capita income is some depressed regions.
6 An alternative mechanism for awarding disability bene¯ts
In this section we propose a simple screening alternative to the Social Security awarding process16.
We evaluate the relative e±ciency, evaluated by the award error, committed by both methods of
classi¯cation. The best mechanism will be that providing the minimum number of undeserved
disability bene¯ts.
If the Social Security were to know the true disability status of the applicants, d¤, would use
this information in the process of awarding bene¯ts. We have mentioned that some individuals
have incentives to misreport to Social Security, but these incentives disappear when they are
answering a private and con¯dential survey. Under the hypothesis of rational expectations,
we can regress our preferred deserving indicator (based on self-reported measures) on a set of
explanatory variables X.17 After estimation, we compute the probability of deserving conditional
16See Ben¶ ³tez Silva et al. (2005) for an alternative screening mechanism.
17In the probit model the dependent variable is the preferred criterion # 6. The set of explanatory variables
includes: rehabilitation treatment, caretaker, impairment certi¯cate, change of house because of a disability and
the 36 disabilities mentioned in Appendix C.1. With respect to disabilities we have de¯ned a dummy variable
that takes the value one if disability is su®ered with moderate or higher severity and with a prognosis di®erent
from recoverable. The size of the sample is bigger than in the bivariate probit model because we do not need to
drop observations for which some economic variables are unknown. That's why we can estimate all disabilities
separately. The results of the estimation procedure are available on request.
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on X, ^ P(djX). Then, we award (A) a bene¯t to those individuals having a probability of
deserving above a given threshold, ® 2 [0;1]:
A = If ^ P(djX) ¸ ®g (1)
Adjusting the level of ® we obtain di®erent percentages of bene¯ts, the bigger ® the smaller the
number of disability bene¯ts.
Consider that the Social Security administration objective is to achieve a given fraction of





If ^ P(djX) ¸ ®gf(X)dX (2)
We can compute the sample analog of expression (2) and obtain the optimal value of ®, say
^ ®, for which the percentage of individuals which receive bene¯ts is equal to the Social security
objective, p:
Figure 3 shows the corresponding density function for both men and women. We indicate
with a discontinuous line the index (®) that makes the right tail equal to the probability of
receiving a disability bene¯t conditioned to deserving it18. This probability is 0.4919 for men
and 0.1610 for women, and the corresponding indexes are 0.3647 for men and 1.2455 for women,
with a standard deviation equal to 0.0016 and 1.2455, respectively.
We award a disability bene¯t to those individuals with a value of ^ P(djX) greater than ^ ®:
Then we compare the e±ciency between the Social Security and the screening mechanism. Our
mechanism will be better than Social Security if satis¯es three requirements. First, reduces
the number of individuals that receive with Social Security but don't deserve. Second, includes
all individuals that are receiving according to Social Security and deserve. And third, doesn't
award bene¯ts to new individuals who don't deserve it.
6.1 Results
Table 8 presents some summary measures obtained from the analysis. First, we observe that all
individuals who receive and deserve bene¯ts with Social Security also receive with the alternative
18We could have used the rate of awards (# of applications / # of awards), but with the information from the
survey we only know if the individual receives a bene¯t but not if he has applied for and it has been denied. The
economic interpretation for using the probability of receiving conditioned to deserving is that individuals with a
high probability of deserving should receive a bene¯t.
21Table 8: Comparison between the Social Security and the screening mechanism.
Men Women
Social Security
* Total 1333 429
* Receive and deservea 487(36.53%) 218(50.82%)
* Receive but do not deserveb 846(63.47%) 211(49.18%)
Screening mechanism
* Total 542 254
* Receive now, with SS and deserve 487(89.85%) 218(85.83%)
* Receive now, with SS but do not deserve 40(7.38%) 25(9.84%)
* Receive now, not with SS and deserve 15(2.77%) 11(4.33%)
* Receive now, not with SS but do not deserve 0 0
a In the bivariate probit model, we had 304 men and 111 women that received a permanent disability
bene¯t and deserved it. Now we have more observations because we have not dropped those
individuals for which we do not know relation with economic activity before receiving the bene¯t.
b There are 695 men and 181 women that receive a permanent disability bene¯t but
do not su®er any disability.
mechanism. Second, the number of individuals who receive but do not deserve decrease from
63.46% to 7.38% for men and from 49.18% to 9.84% for women. Third, this mechanism does not
assign bene¯ts to any individual who does not deserve bene¯ts. Finally there are 2.77% of men
and 4.33% of women who deserve but do not receive according to Social Security. Unfortunately
we do not know whether they have not applied for bene¯ts or, conditional on applying, their
application have been rejected. Finally, we have reduced the number of bene¯ts by 58.89% for
men and 49.18% for women.
From those individuals who receive but do not deserve, 82% declare to su®er disabilities for
moving without way of transport, in public transport or in his own vehicle, but only 21.42%
receives technical aids. This suggests that the improvement of facilities and reduction of archi-
tectural barriers could help in avoiding some of these situations.
The main lesson of this section is that administrative data should be regarded with some
suspicion. This is so because applicants have incentives to misreport true disability status, but
also because Provincial Departments of Social Security may have quantitative (or redistributive)
targets regarding the placement of individuals.
We do not propose the disappearance of the whole bureaucracy of the Social Security, just
because individuals could be tempted to misreport disabilities when answering the survey with
the purpose of increasing the probability of deserving. In order to avoid these problems, we
suggest several control measures over the applicant and the disability referees. For example, a
medical team should visit the home and the working place of the applicant and study the way of
displacement between both. Also random audits should be performed on medical judgements,
conditioning examiner's wage earnings to the coincidence between his verdict and that of the
auditor.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we partially audit the permanent disability awarding process in Spain in order
to detect award errors, which can be assimilated in many cases (specially for those that are
healthy), to bene¯t concessions due to economic reasons. In a preliminar but not less important
22step, we have designed up to six alternative deserving indicators using a very large number of
self-reported disability measures from the DDHS survey. After choosing the best indicator on
the basis of exogeneity and consistency criteria, we have estimated a latent variable bivariate
econometric model for the decisions of receiving and deserving for those individuals who have
developed contributive careers.
Disability bene¯ts in many European countries are due to "truly" medical reason, to eco-
nomic reason and/or the combination of these two factors. One of the objectives of this exercise
is to tentatively distinguish between them. For example, those in sample receiving a disability
bene¯ts which do not have any disability can be classi¯ed as receiving a bene¯t dut to "eco-
nomic reasons". Alternatively those receiving a bene¯t having some disabilities but of limited
importance can be classi¯ed as receiving a bene¯t due to the combination of disabilities and
economic reasons or policies.
After controlling for disabilities, limitations and other factors, we ¯nd that the individuals
aged between 55 and 59, the self-employed or workers in the agricultural sector have a probability
of receiving a bene¯t without deserving it signi¯cantly higher than the rest of individuals. This
con¯rms that disability bene¯ts have been used as a pathway to retirement for individuals below
the early retirement age. Most likely the extension of the right to retire early (at age 60 at the
time of the survey 1999 or before) may help in reducing the award error for this sector.
We have also shown that there are signi¯cant regional di®erences in the probability of receiv-
ing a bene¯t. This probability is higher in less developed Spanish regions: Asturias-Cantabria,
Murcia, Andalucia and Extremadura. If we take into account that the awarding process depends
on Social Security Provincial o±ces, it becomes clear that something abnormal is happening in
the evaluation of the worker health status. The head of each Social Security Provincial O±ces
determines if a given applicant gets a pension of disability on the basis of the statement pro-
posed by the Disability Evaluation Team. This statement indicates if there is a decrease or
annulment of work capacity, if the above mentioned situation is constitutive of disability and
in what degree. Therefore, the existence of award error implies either that the medical reports
provided by the applicant were untrue, or that the classi¯cation statement elaborated by the
Disability Evaluation Team is incorrect, or, most likely, that many disabilities in these regions
are due to economic regions.
All these are elements of policy and with policy can be reduced. There are several policies
that may help in reducing award errors. One possibility would be to carry out more diagnosis
tests and explorations, although this would increase audit expenditures. For example, in the
case of the osteoarticular pathologies in which pain plays a crucial role there is a trade o®
between the accomplishment of some expensive tests and the risk of paying undue pensions.
We cannot forget the ¯gure of revision due to improvement, worsening or misdiagnosis before
65 years old. This instrument eliminates the possibility of a life declaration without possibility
of repeal. Nevertheless, it does not seem that revisions done up to the moment have settled
the problem of award errors, since in the DDHS survey there are 2448 pensioners older than 65
years old, from which 1164 (47.55 %) have declared not to su®er any disability.
The Spanish Observatory of the Social Security has recently proposed several measures in
order to improve the regulation of permanent disability bene¯ts, preventing the access for the
careers with insu±cient contributions. First, the amount of the pension would be de¯ned in
terms of the bene¯t base and the quotation period (up to the moment the number of working
years was not taken into account). Second, the approval of a list of occupational diseases with
e®ect in permanent disability bene¯ts. And ¯nally, the exclusion of the permanent disability
of those professions which technical requirements are unattainable for old-aged workers. In this
case, it also proposes to modify retirement bene¯ts relaxing the penalties for age.
Finally, we have designed a screening mechanism in which individuals receive a bene¯t if they
have a su±ciently high deserving probability. With this mechanism the award error is signi¯-
23cantly reduced. We do not propose in this paper to replace the Social Security awarding process
by a computer procedure, but we emphasize that e±ciency can be improved and expenditures
in non-deserved bene¯ts may be substantially reduced.
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Appendix
A. Disabilities, De¯ciencies and Health Status Survey
In 1986, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) performed a survey to detect the most impor-
tant disabilities and de¯ciencies among the Spanish population according to the International
Classi¯cation of Disabilities, De¯ciencies and Impairments of the World Health Organization
(WHO). This information has turned obsolete and it has been necessary to renew it. The Disabil-
ities, De¯ciencies and Health Status Survey [www.ine.es/prodyser/pubweb/discapa/discapamenu.htm]
was aimed at identifying the actual situation of individuals with disabilities and was carried out
by the Spanish statistical o±ce during the second term of 1999. The main method to collect
the information is personal interview to all the members of the selected household.
The survey is divided in three phases identi¯ed with the following questionnaires:
1. Household Questionnaire: collects socioeconomic information from all household members
in order to establish di®erences between people with and without disabilities.
262. Disabilities and De¯ciencies Questionnaire: for people of 6 and more years who su®er at
least one disability or de¯ciency. Individuals are required to enumerate all disabilities
su®ered according to a established classi¯cation of 36 disabilities and 27 de¯ciencies, in-
dicating also the degree of severity, expected evolution, age when su®ering the disability
problem, de¯ciency that caused the disability, origin and duration. Finally, it also includes
questions relating disabilities to changes in occupation and labor force status.
The D&D questionnaire has two important limitations: the degree of disability for perma-
nent disability pensioners, and the possible denial of an application for disability bene¯ts
are unknown. The former limitation prevent us from analyzing the rejection error.
3. Limitations and Impairments Questionnaire: for children with less than 6 years that su®er
some limitation (not used for the purpose of the paper)
4. Health Questionnaire: selects randomly one member from each household no matter if he
is a®ected or not by some disability (not used in the paper because the random nature of
the sample reduces the number of available observations considerably)
This survey only gathers those disabilities that have a®ected or are expected to a®ect daily
living activities for a period over a year. It is necessary to specify that certain disabilities
produced by certain disfunctions (schizophrenia, depression, labyrinthine dizziness...) appear
repeatedly in certain moments called crisis during life. An individual is considered to su®er one
of these disabilities if the sum of the critical periods is larger than one year.
All disabilities are investigated even if they are overcome with the use of some technical
help. It is important to specify that only are considered to be disabilities those that have
been overcome with the use of technical external helps (crutches, wheels chair, prothesis of
substitution of some member, auditory devices, probes, oxygen...), remaining excluded those
that have been overcome by the use of technical internal helps (pacemaker, intraocular lenses,
prothesis of knee, cardiac valves, cerebral valves of decompression...). An exception is done in
case of vision disabilities, since we only take into account those that survive with the use of
glasses or contact lenses.
For the de¯nition of the six disability indicators, we have not included any reference to the
use of technical help, because legislation establishes that each case must be studied separately,
according to impairment, nature of the help and adaptation degree to it.
B. Description of the variables
Classi¯cation of disabilities, severity and prognosis
For each of the following 36 disabilities we de¯ne a binary variable that takes the value one if the individual
declares to su®er this disability and the value zero in other case.
1. Seeing: (a)Receiving any image; (b) Global visual tasks; (c) Detailed visual tasks; (d) Other visual
disabilities.
2. Hearing (a): Hearing any sound; (b) Hearing strong sounds; (c) Listening the speech.
3. Communicating: (a) Communicating through speech; (b) Communicating through alternative lan-
guages; (c) Communicating through not sealed gestures; (d) Communicating through conventional
writing - reading.
4. Learning, applying knowledge and developing topics: (a) Recognizing persons/objects and being
orientated in space and in time; (b) Remembering information and recent or past episodes; (c)
Dealing and executing simple orders and/or doing simple tasks; (d) Dealing and executing complex
orders and/or doing complex tasks.
275. Moving: (a) Changes and maintenance of body positions; (b) Getting up and down and standing
up; (c) Moving inside home.
6. Using arms and hands: (a) Moving/transporting not very heavy objects; (b) Using utensils and
tools; (c) Manipulating small objects with hands and ¯ngers.
7. Moving out of home: (a) Moving without way of transport; (b) Moving in public transport; (c)
Driving own vehicle.
8. Looking after oneself: (a) Washing oneself; (b) Controlling physical needs; (c) Dressing and un-
dressing; (d) Eating and drinking;
9. Houseworking: (a) Do the shopping; (b) Cooking; (c) Washing and ironing clothes; (d) Cleaning
the house; (e) Looking after the well-being of the family.
10. Relating to people: (a) Supporting relations of fondness with close relatives; (b) Doing friends; (c)
Relating to companions, chiefs and subordinates;
Classi¯cation of the variable severity Classi¯cation of variable prognosis
1. Without any di±culty 1. Recoverable
2. With moderate di±culty 2. Recoverable with restrictions
3. With serious di±culty 3. Stable without perspectives of improvement
4. Can not do the activity 4. Can go worse
5. It is not possible to determine it.
Classi¯cation of the de¯ciencies
We group the following 27 de¯ciencies in 8 categories:
1. Mental de¯ciencies: (a) Insanity; (b) Other mental illnesses.
2. Visual de¯ciencies: (a) Total blindness; (b) Bad vision.
3. Hearing de¯ciencies: (a) Deafness before speaking; (b) Deafness after speaking; (c) Bad hearing;
(d) Disfunction of the balance.
4. De¯ciencies of the language, speech and voice: (a) Muteness (not because of deafness); (b) Di±cult
or incomprehensible speech.
5. Osteoarticular de¯ciencies: (a) Head; (b) Vertebral column; (c) Upper extremities; (d) Low ex-
tremities.
6. De¯ciencies of the nervous system: (a) Paralysis of an upper extremity; (b) Paralysis of a low
extremity; (c) Paraplegia; (d) Tetraplegia; (e) Dysfunction of the coordination of movements; (f)
Other de¯ciencies of the nervous system.
7. Visceral de¯ciencies: (a) Respiratory device; (b) Cardiovascular device; (c) Digestive device; (d)
Genital-urinary device; (e) Endocrine-metabolic device; (f) Hematopoietic device and immunitary
system.
8. Other de¯ciencies: (a) Skin.
Classi¯cation of the problem that caused the de¯ciency
1. Congenital 6. Labor accident
2. Problems in the childbirth 7. Another type of accident
3. Tra±c accident 8. Common disease
4. Domestic accident 9. Occupational disease
5. Leisure accident 10. Other reasons
28Description of the variables of the bivariate probit model
* Disabilities and de¯ciencies:
We have de¯ned a binary variable that takes the value one if the individual su®ers one of the following
disabilities or de¯ciencies.:
² De¯ciencies: (1) Vertebral column; (2) Upper and low extremities.
² Disabilities: (1) Seeing; (2) Hearing; (3) Communicating; (4) Remembering; (5) Executing orders;
(6) Maintaining body postures; (7) Moving inside home; (8) Using hands and ¯ngers; (9) Moving
outside home; (10) Taking care of oneself; (11) Houseworking; (12) Relating.
We have only included de¯ciencies referred to vertebral column and upper and low extremities because
given the de¯nitions of the survey, a de¯ciency is the pathological cause of a disability, it seems reasonable
that an individual with disability for global visual tasks is also going to declare bad vision, or an individual
with paralysis of a low extremity is going to answer disability for moving inside home and using public
transport. Hence, to avoid unnecessary duplicities we have omitted most of the de¯ciencies in the bivariate
probit model. Besides that, what really matters for permanent disability is not the name of the illness
but the repercussion on labor capacity.
In fact, osteoarticular de¯ciencies are the most important ones. In fact, 56.03% of individuals receiving
a bene¯t (22.43% men and 33.60% women) su®er vertebral column problems, 29.46% (12.66% men and
16.80% women) are a®ected by upper extremities de¯ciencies and 37.69% (16.89% men and 20.80%) by
low extremities pathologies. This de¯ciencies are also declared by many individuals who receive a bene¯t
but do not deserve it. (See Tables C.2 and C.3).
* Socioeconomic variables
Age between 55-59 1 if age is between 55 and 59
Married 1 if he/she is married
Spouse working 1 if spouse is working
Spouse disability bene¯t 1 if spouse receives a disability bene¯t
Household main breadwinner 1 if he/she is the household main breadwinner
* Health variables
Caretaker 1 if he/she needs somebody to take care of him/her
Impairment certi¯cate 1 if he/has has received an impairment certi¯cate
Rehabilitation treatment 1 if he/she has ¯nished a rehabilitation treatment
Change of house 1 if he/she has moved because of a disability
* Level of Education
Without studies (omitted category)
Elementary 1 if he/she has only ¯nished elementary education
High School 1 if he/she has only ¯nished high school or vocational training
College 1 if he/she is a graduate or bachelor
* Relation with economic activity
The omitted category for active is \inactive" and for unemployed is \working". If individual is receiving now
a disability bene¯t, the dummy unemployed takes the value one if that was relation with economic activity before
becoming pensioner.
Active 1 if he/she is active (working or unemployed)
Unemployed 1 if he/she is unemployed but has already worked
* Skill level:
The omitted category is \Unskilled"
29White collar
1 if management, public administration, white collars workers,
and intellectuals
Skilled
1 if he/she is a quali¯ed worker in agriculture, cattle raising,
¯shing, industry, mining industry, construction, services
* Sector of occupation:
The omitted category is \family helper".
Self-employer 1 if he/she is a self-employer
Public sector 1 if he/she is working at the public sector
Private sector 1 if he/she is working at the private sector
* Activity sector: we have de¯ned a binary variable for each sector (agriculture/ cattle raising/
¯shing, industry, construction and services).
* Place of residence: we have de¯ned a binary variable for each of the 19 Spanish regions. However,
due to the small sample size for some communities we have grouped Ceuta and Melilla with Andaluc¶ ³a,
Navarra and Rioja with Arag¶ on and Asturias with Cantabria.
C. Descriptive Tables
Table C.1. Ratio permanent disability bene¯ts to retirement bene¯ts
Ratio disability to retirement bene¯ts GDPpc
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1998 2000 2002 1998
Andaluc¶ ³a 91.9 93.3 88.6 84.6 76.5 27.3 27.0 26.4 56.1
Arag¶ on 42.1 40.7 38.6 38.0 34.0 13.6 13.2 13.1 89.0
Asturias 56.4 54.3 51.6 50.6 45.7 18.7 18.5 18.9 66.9
Baleares 42.3 41.8 42.8 45.0 43.4 19.2 20.0 20.6 118.7
Canarias 74.6 74.6 73.2 67.0 58.5 23.8 22.3 21.7 78.6
Cantabria 43.9 43.9 43.7 43.0 39.3 15.2 15.0 15.1 74.2
Castilla La M 52.9 51.9 48.7 45.8 40.3 14.2 14.1 14.3 64.5
Castilla Le¶ on 54.2 52.4 48.3 45.5 39.1 13.4 12.5 11.9 73.6
Catalu~ na 57.2 56.8 53.5 49.2 43.4 18.7 17.9 17.1 101.4
Extremadura 56.6 57.5 55.8 53.4 47.7 18.1 16.9 16.4 55.4
Galicia 55.2 55.6 54.3 51.9 45.1 14.2 13.7 13.4 67.9
Madrid 40.2 35.4 37.5 35.6 31.0 14.2 13.2 12.6 109.2
Murcia 150.4 155.8 152.0 142.3 116.4 29.8 26.9 25.2 66.3
Navarra 52.1 49.7 46.4 44.3 39.4 16.6 16.0 15.9 98.5
Pa¶ ³s Vasco 47.8 45.3 43.1 41.0 37.0 17.6 16.6 15.8 90.3
La Rioja 65.9 64.4 60.4 58.5 50.2 18.0 17.0 16.1 96.2
Comunidad Val. 52.7 49.9 45.7 42.2 38.9 16.7 16.5 16.7 82.8
Ceuta 83.3 70.0 63.6 50.0 44.8 19.4 19.4 18.1 61.7
Melilla 100.0 94.1 88.9 90.0 90.5 33.3 33.3 32.3 64.7
Espa~ na 59.1 57.5 55.2 52.2 46.4 18.3 17.6 17.2 81.5
Notes: GDPpc: Gross GDP per capita (EU15=100); Since 1998 (Law 24/1997) disability bene¯ts for indi-
viduals aged 65+ are counted as retirement bene¯ts. Sources: Ministry of Labor and Social Issues and FBBVA.
30Table C.2. Prevalence of Disabilities and de¯ciencies.
Men Women Men w bene¯ts Women w bene¯ts
Deserve Not Des Deserve Not Des Deserve Not Des Deserve Not Des
N 709 275 440 112 306 73 111 25
Disability for:
Seeing 22.43 22.55 22.95 14.29 20.92 15.07 24.32 21.43
Hearing 22.99 28.00 18.86 30.36 11.44 10.96 9.01 0
Communicating 12.41 3.64 8.64 2.68 14.71 6.85 9.91 7.14
Learning, applying knowledge 10.58 0.73 9.32 1.79 12.42 0 9.91 0
Moving 32.44 18.91 41.82 25.00 40.52 30.14 45.95 14.29
Using arms and hands 33.99 23.18 43.64 28.57 46.41 36.99 48.65 42.86
Moving outside home 55.15 28.00 54.32 22.32 69.28 41.10 61.26 21.43
Looking after oneself 15.66 4.00 15.23 4.46 20.92 8.22 22.52 0
Houseworking 20.31 7.64 44.32 20.54 29.41 19.18 56.76 28.57
Relating to people 10.30 1.82 11.36 4.46 12.41 2.74 13.51 7.14
De¯ciency for:
Mental de¯ciencies 9.45 1.45 9.77 7.14 14.38 2.74 13.51 21.43
Visual de¯ciencies 20.31 21.09 20.91 13.39 18.30 9.59 21.62 14.29
Hearing de¯ciencies 22.28 27.64 18.18 29.46 10.78 10.96 9.01 0
De¯ciencies of the language 2.40 1.09 1.59 0.89 2.94 1.37 1.80 7.14
Osteoarticular de¯ciencies 39.49 36.36 54.55 32.12 44.44 53.42 63.06 28.57
De¯ciencies nervous system 10.58 3.64 9.77 5.36 16.67 5.48 11.71 7.14
Visceral de¯ciencies 11.99 8.36 8.41 8.93 19.93 15.07 9.01 21.43
Other de¯ciencies 0.14 0.36 0.45 0 0.33 0 0.9 0
Table C.4. Socioeconomic characteristics
Men Women
Receive Receive Receive Receive
Deserve Not deserve Deserve Not deserve
Needs caretaker 7.30 0 18.11 0
Rehabilitation treatment 30.25 28.38 35.43 35.29
Change of house because of disability 7.62 6.76 10.24 11.76
Married 80.72 83.56 64.86 50
Spouse is working 15.14 6.71 29.53 9.06
Main breadwinner 84.97 90.41 27.03 35.71
Age between 55-59 47.06 35.62 47.75 28.57
Education
*Without elementary 31.05 32.77 35.13 28.57
*Elementary 46.73 43.94 40.54 35.71
*High School 18.63 20.55 15.32 21.43
*College 3.59 2.74 9.01 14.29
Professional occupation (before DB)
*Unskilled 22.14 18.84 52.25 42.87
*Skilled 65.44 72.46 40.54 35.71
*White collar 12.42 8.70 7.21 21.42
31Table C.5. Spouse labor force status
Men Women
Without With DB Without Without DB
DB Deserve Not deserve DB Deserve Not deserve
Working 27.66 22.66 13.11 58.19 48.75 25
Working but temporary absent 0.58 1.17 1.74
Looking for ¯rst job 0.39 0.78 1.64 0.35
Unemployed (has worked before) 5.61 7.42 6.56 13.59 13.75
Unable for working 0.77 1.95 3.28 3.83 6.25
Contributive Disability Bene¯t (DB) 1.74 3.91 6.56 9.06 15 37.5
Not Contributive Disability Bene¯t 2.9 2.34 3.28 0.7
Retirement Bene¯t 0.77 1.17 11.15 16.25 12.5
Studying 0.39 0.78
Houseworking 58.41 57.42 63.96
Other situations 0.77 0.39 1.64 1.39 25
Men (N=984) 82.43% of the sample is married; Women (N=552) 65.28% of the sample is married
32D. Estimations and forecasts
Table D.1. Bivariate probit. Sample with disabilities (sample B1)
Men Women
Deserve Receive Deserve Receive
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Constant -0.8056 3.50 -0.9608 -3.20 -0.8503 -2.20 -0.9293 -2.68
Disability
Vertebral column 0.4186 2.14 0.3044 2.02 0.7184 3.48 0.1936 2.08
Upper and low extremities 0.0552 2.27 0.2642 2.50 0.4462 1.82 0.0813 2.39
Seeing 0.3658 2.27 0.0253 2.17 0.9053 4.01 0.0346 2.20
Hearing 0.3194 1.93 0.3654 3.54 0.4573 2.13 0.6298 2.84
Communicating 0.2465 2.00 0.4685 2.01 0.7546 2.75 0.8165 2.45
Remembering 0.2852 2.37 0.3842 2.95 0.3427 2.59 0.2613 2.59
Executing orders 0.3134 1.90 0.2885 2.80 0.1950 2.19 1.1224 1.93
Maintaining body postures 0.2282 2.05 0.0316 2.16 0.0706 3.30 0.2068 1.99
Moving inside home 0.4744 2.41 0.0295 2.17 0.0291 3.13 0.1602 2.80
Using hands and ¯ngers 0.2162 2.49 0.2821 2.19 0.3649 2.14 0.1926 2.24
Moving outside home 0.4109 2.87 0.3889 3.63 0.6666 3.72 0.1091 2.65
Taking care of oneself 0.5355 2.19 0.1974 3.10 0.0938 2.31 0.1865 2.36
Houseworking 0.0405 2.18 0.5447 2.95 0.3401 1.83 0.4302 2.48
Relating 0.8202 2.38 0.5579 2.93 0.5068 2.30 0.1732 3.05
Socioeconomic characteristics
Age between 55-59 0.0733 2.64 0.1379 2.21 0.2069 2.35 0.1332 2.90
Change of house 0.3917 2.11 0.6247 2.18 0.0516 2.15 0.5162 1.91
Impairment certi¯cate 0.1240 2.91 0.7150 5.77 0.2575 2.41 0.5962 3.76
Needs caretaker 0.7702 2.38 0.1811 2.60 0.2694 2.93 0.3602 2.20
Rehabilitation treatment 0.1286 2.81 0.2731 1.92 0.0582 2.34 0.0366 2.24
Spouse working -0.0191 1.52 -0.4148 -2.82 0.0038 1.18 -0.1079 -2.13
Spouse disability bene¯t 0.0189 1.75 0.3089 2.67 0.0058 1.69 0.1699 2.55
Married 0.0249 0.63 0.0988 2.01 0.0105 0.71 0.0141 1.98
Elementary 0.8045 2.09 1.6779 1.96 0.3394 2.63 0.9641 2.51
High School 0.5977 2.23 0.6317 2.05 0.0300 2.39 -0.1359 -2.88
College 0.2952 2.05 0.3559 2.42 -0.0893 -2.27 -0.6535 -2.02
Active 0.1841 2.01 0.3195 -1.90 -0.0569 -2.24 0.2020 2.03
Unemployed -0.4425 -2.93 -0.2975 -2.14 0.1578 2.62 -1.4187 -3.09
Main breadwinner -0.1978 -0.96 0.0860 2.43 0.0243 1.11 0.1554 2.67
White collar -0.1316 -2.60 0.1696 3.43 0.1917 2.77 0.8429 3.42
Skilled worker -0.0175 3.34 0.7779 5.13 0.3394 1.94 0.9641 4.00
Regions (Murcia omitted)
Andaluc¶ ³a-Ceuta-Melilla 0.7624 1.39 -0.0073 -1.99 0.5326 1.17 -0.1275 -2.08
Arag¶ on-Navarra-Rioja 0.7546 1.60 -0.2636 -1.99 0.5235 1.21 -0.4570 -1.89
Asturias-Cantabria 1.0826 1.18 -1.0627 -2.22 0.2898 0.76 -0.5114 -2.46
Baleares 0.7349 1.12 -1.0076 -2.02 0.2621 0.61 -0.1546 -2.54
Canarias 0.4906 0.96 -1.0566 -1.91 0.5562 1.32 -0.6078 -2.31
Castilla La Mancha 0.9363 0.86 -0.9415 -3.19 0.2946 0.80 -0.3446 1.97
Castilla Le¶ on 0.5839 1.35 -0.8752 -2.04 0.3379 1.16 -0.5008 -1.84
Catalu~ na 0.6279 1.41 -0.2638 -2.29 0.5208 1.35 -0.4553 -2.06
Extremadura 1.1119 1.01 -0.0242 -1.90 0.8071 1.38 -0.2529 -1.87
Galicia 0.4978 1.13 -0.3957 -1.99 0.2577 0.49 -0.4569 -2.26
Madrid 1.0609 1.06 -0.9277 -2.08 0.4127 1.18 -0.6261 -2.78
Pa¶ ³s Vasco 0.05818 1.24 -0.8396 -2.87 0.0953 0.23 -0.7922 -2.46
Comunidad Valenciana 0.3563 0.75 -0.5315 -1.84 0.3380 1.11 -0.4381 -2.54
N 984 552
Rho 0.3690 0.3161
Log likelihood -702.3350 -460.4645
33Table D.2. Marginal probabilities. Men with disabilities
Deserving % to Receiving % to
(1) Baseline (2) Baseline (1)-(2)/(1)
Baseline (BL) 0.3235 0.4539 -0.4031
Disability
Vertebral column 0.4843 47.91 0.5748 26.63 -0.1868
Upper and low extremities 0.3437 6.24 0.5589 23.13 -1.5261
Seeing 0.4633 43.21 0.4639 2.20 -0.0013
Hearing 0.4449 37.53 0.5985 31.86 -0.3446
Communicating 0.4163 28.69 0.6378 40.52 -0.5321
Remembering 0.4314 33.35 0.6058 33.47 -0.4043
Executing orders 0.4426 31.68 0.5685 25.25 -0.2845
Maintaining body postures 0.4092 26.49 0.4664 2.75 -0.1398
Moving inside home 0.5066 56.60 0.4656 2.58 0.0809
Using hands and ¯ngers 0.4045 25.04 0.5660 24.70 -0.3993
Moving outside home 0.4813 48.78 0.6076 33.86 -0.2624
Taking care of oneself 0.5309 64.11 0.5325 17.31 -0.0030
Houseworking 0.3382 4.54 0.6659 46.71 -0.9689
Relating 0.6414 98.26 0.6708 47.79 -0.0458
Socioeconomic characteristics
Age between 55-59 0.3503 8.28 0.5088 12.09 -0.4502
Change of house 0.4736 46.40 0.6946 53.03 -0.4666
Impairment certi¯cate 0.3692 14.12 0.7255 59.84 -0.9643
Needs caretaker 0.6226 92.46 0.5259 15.82 0.1552
Rehabilitation treatment 0.3710 14.68 0.5518 25.57 -0.4873
Spouse working 0.3256 0.65 0.3329 -28.87 0.0083
Spouse disability bene¯t 0.3394 4.91 0.6148 35.46 -0.8114
Married 0.3325 2.79 0.4932 8.65 -0.4833
Elementary and unskilled 0.6244 93.01 0.8829 94.51 -0.4139
High School and skilled 0.4838 49.55 0.7951 75.24 -0.6434
High School and white collar 0.4832 49.36 0.7847 72.92 -0.6239
College and skilled 0.3654 12.95 0.6958 53.29 -0.9042
Main breadwinner 0.2560 -20.86 0.4881 7.53 -0.9066
Unemployed 0.4933 52.49 0.3396 -25.18 0.3116
Regions (Murcia omitted)
Andaluc¶ ³a-Ceuta-Melilla 0.6197 91.56 0.4509 -0.66 0.2724
Arag¶ on-Navarra-Rioja 0.6167 96.63 0.3521 -24.43 0.4298
Asturias-Cantabria 0.7339 126.86 0.1193 -73.72 0.8374
Baleares 0.6091 88.28 0.1306 -71.23 0.7856
Canarias 0.5528 70.88 0.1205 -73.45 0.7828
Castilla La Mancha 0.6838 111.37 0.1452 -68.01 0.7145
Castilla L¶ eon 0.5502 70.07 0.1608 -64.57 0.7077
Catalu~ na 0.5675 66.15 0.3521 -22.43 0.3796
Extremadura 0.7434 129.79 0.4443 -2.11 0.4023
Galicia 0.5160 59.50 0.3044 -32.94 0.4185
Madrid 0.7267 124.64 0.1483 -67.33 0.7959
Pa¶ ³s Vasco 0.5493 69.79 0.1697 -62.61 0.6911
Comunidad Valenciana 0.4595 42.04 0.2586 -43.03 0.4372
BL: male, below 55, single, college, white collar, living in Murcia, with moderate disabilities, without rehabilitation
treatment, impairment certi¯cate, caretaker and has not changed house because of disability.
34Table D.3. Probability of receiving being healthy (sample B0 )
a
Men Women
Coef. t Coef. t
Constant -1.021 -9.73 -1.524 -8.19
Age 50-54 0.141 3.00 0.079 0.96
Age 55-59 0.448 9.72 0.384 4.74
Married -0.155 -2.78 -0.220 -2.38
Main breadwinner -0.287 -4.69 -0.013 -0.14
Elementary -0.208 -4.29 -0.299 -3.39
High School -0.479 -8.00 -0.506 -4.82
College -0.733 -9.80 -0.635 -5.44
Andalucia-Ceuta-Melilla -0.110 -1.30 0.081 0.51
Aragon-Navarrra-Rioja -0.199 -2.05 -0.062 -0.34
Baleares -0.268 -1.90 -0.204 -0.79
Canarias -0.457 -3.61 -0.796 -2.26
C. La Mancha -0.298 -2.82 -0.144 -0.68
C. Le¶ on -0.280 -3.07 -0.228 -1.26
Catalu~ na -0.347 -3.66 0.078 0.48
Extremadura -0.204 -1.67 -0.406 -1.28
Galicia -0.268 -2.75 -0.284 -1.54
Madrid -0.459 -4.11 -0.348 -1.64
Murcia -0.275 -2.04 0.077 0.35
Pa¶ ³s Vasco -0.340 -2.98 -0.090 -0.45
C. Valenciana -0.214 -2.14 -0.075 -0.41
N 16980 7491
Log Likelihood -2708.02 -791.95
pseudo R
2 0.0668 0.0704
a Omitted categories: age 45-49, no education and living in Asturias or Cantabria.
Table D.4. Marginal probability of receiving being healthy (sample B0)
a
Men Women
45-49 50-54 55-59 45-49 50-54 55-59
Baseline .1536 .1894 .2832 .0637 .0742 .1271
Living in Madrid .0694 .0902 .1509 .0306 .0365 .0684
Married .1198 .1504 .2333 .0405 .0479 .0869
Main breadwinner .0954 .1216 .1948 .0621 .0724 .1244
Elementary .1094 .1382 .2172 .0341 .0405 .0750
Secondary .0668 .0870 .1463 .0212 .0255 .0499
College .0397 .0534 .0958 .0154 .0187 .0379
a Baseline: single, no breadwinner, high school education and living in Asturias or Cantabria.
35